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Abstract 
In the following text I propose a certain view of historiography of philosophy. My starting point will be the analysis of 
Richard Rorty regarding the historiography of philosophy. The first part will discuss Rorty's text and the differences between 
various ways of approaching the history of philosophy. Rorty's text is important because it reveals a lack of unitary vision 
when we are speaking about the best way in which we can write history of philosophy. This lack of unity implies that there 
are different frames of thinking historiography so we are entitled to say that the clashes between visions constitutes a whole 
new are the philosophy of histor  The following step is to distinguish the philosophy 
of historiography from the philosophy of history. We will see then, that one of the most important questions of philosophy of 
historiography is: what is philosophy? Before we start writing the history of philosophy, we should ask ourselves what is our 
view about the nature of philosophy. Following the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, my view is that 
.  Viewing the philosophy in this way implies that the history of 
philosophy is a history of concepts. Since the concepts are constructed entities, and not discovered things, it follows that 
viewing the history of philosophy in this way, forces us to adopt a constructivist approach.     
 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Claudiu Mesaros (West University of 
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Keywords: historiography of philosophy; philosophy of historiography; philosophy of history; constructivism; art of concept creation. 
 
1. Introduction  
When  we should take into considerations two main aspects: either we refer to 
a set of historical literature which covers a certain subject, or we refer to particular aspects which are in direct 
relation with the methods that a historian applies in his work. Implicitly, when we consider a debate about 
methods, either we question which of the methods is better or more efficient than the others, or we question 
which is the most suitable historical method which allows us to have a better representation of the events that 
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took place in the past; we place ourselves in a middle of a philosophical context, and this happens because we 
tend to make epistemological and ontological assumptions. 
Things become more interesting when the main theme of the debate is actually the history of philosophy. I am 
making this statement because the history of a discipline must take into consideration the specificity of that 
certain discipline, and considering that we are talking about philosophy  a discipline which has as a main 
purpose problematization  then in a natural manner, the historiography of philosophy will not lack the difference 
of opinions. In other words, this part of the nature of philosophy which is the problematization, is being 
transferred into the manners that the history of philosophy is being approached. Considering the fact that there 
are many disagreements between philosophers regarding the answers that correspond to philosophical questions, 
we question even more which the real and important philosophical questions are, and which are the pseudo-
problems. Or if there are perennial questions which any true philosopher should try to answer, or if, on the 
contrary, the questions which belong to philosophy are contextual  specific to a certain historical era  then it is 
clear that a history of philosophy will be determined by the possible answers that the author will take into 
consideration. Because of this, a history of philosophy will look differently compared to a history of science, and 
this happens because a history of philosophy is determined by a certain matrix, with a particular interpretation 
rule which can be different from author to author. For example, a history of chemistry will have the purpose to 
look at the facts and the events that are relevant for that discipline, so that the isolation of carbon dioxide made 
by Joseph Black will be treated equally as the isolation of oxygen accomplished by Karl Wilhelm Schule and 
Joseph Priestley. Someone who is writing a history of philosophy will select the authors that seem relevant to 
him  determined by his own philosophical views. I do not want the above statements to be interpreted in a 
relativist key  my scope is to emphasize the fact that a history of philosophy implies that the author is operating 
certain cuts, certain alterations, structures and ranks  organizing depending on his beliefs. So when we talk 
about a historian of philosophy, we can state that his work will be based on interpreting facts, events depending 
on an interpretation spectrum. All these things are suggested either implicitly or explicitly by Richard Rorty in 
his article called The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres [1]. Based on this aspect, I consider it 
necessary to resume the ideas that Rorty exposes in this particular article. In other words, I will take Rorty's text 
as my starting point, mainly because I consider his point of view fundamental for the debates about the 
historiography of philosophy. My thesis is that the American ph
create something we can call a philosophy of historiography of philosophy. Starting from this point, we can 
discern what the characteristics and the specific problems this kind of discipline has, and at the same time, how a 
philosophy of historiography can be different from the philosophy of history. Which can the relations be and 
which could be the specific differences.  
Further on, the structure of my argument is based on the fact that the fundamental question of every 
philosophy of historiography is: What is philosophy? The answer that we give in relation to this question will 
offer us the standard. Starting from this standard, we will build the entire history of philosophy. The answer to 
this question will be the one that will separate the canon that we will impose, and that will help us create a map of 
philosophy. If we follow the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze in embracing the fact that the philosophical 
activity represents the art of creating concepts, the particular manner of a certain type of thinking which helps us 
enable the concepts to work together so that they open up new possibilities to think and to gather the richness of 
experience that life and reality offers us, than a position based on an epistemological point of view can only be a 
constructivist one. While the reality plays herself in a continuous becoming process, the philosophical thinking 
will have to keep up with this transformation; this constant remodeling will have to reconsider the concepts in 
order to offer a straight vision. I want to emphasize once more the fact that my conclusion makes sense only in 
the case in which we accept the premise of Deleuze and Guattari, the one that states that the purpose of 
philosophy is to create concepts  this being the specificity of this particular mode of thinking. On the other hand, 
if the answer to the questio what is philosophy  universalist, essentialist, and 
transcendentalist elements, then my thesis loses its value. 
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2. Rorty's four genres of writing the history of philosophy 
In his article, The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres [1], Richard Rorty frames four types  four 
manners in which the history of philosophy is being written. It is possible that Rorty  is not an exhaustive 
one, but the American philosopher most likely succeeds to cover all the types of the historiography of 
philosophy. In any case, the structure of his exposure is based on the fact that he opposes in the first place two 
types of approach, and then the two of them will be presented in relation to a third synthesizing one. This is a 
classical Hegelian structure
reconstructio . The rational reconstruction implies formulating the 
arguments of the deceased philosophers so that they colleagues with whom they can exchange 
 [1]. The problem with this approach is that it leads to an anachronistic treatment of the dead philosopher 
that we choose to have as an ally, an approach that is not really correct. On the other hand, if someone does not 
one might as well turn over the history of philosophy to historians  whom they picture as mere 
 [1]. In conclusion, it seems that we have two options: 
either we apply the current philosophical vocabulary and we interpret the deceased philosophers using current 
terms, or we try to describe the greatest philosophers of the past considering the context and the specificity of the 
problems of the era they lived in. Even if the two approaches seem to be situated on irreconcilable plans, Rorty 
does not try to rank them hierarchically; more so, he believes they can coexist:  
there is nothing wrong with self-consciously letting our own philosophical views dictate terms in which to describe the dead. But there are 
reasons for describing them in other terms, their own terms. It is useful to recreate the intellectual scene in which the dead lived their lives  
in particular, the real and imagined conversations they might hav  [1]. 
Referring to the historical reconstruction, Rorty considers it an enterprise type which does not lack 
importance. An epistemological dimension is created, which lies beneath the following questions: What is the 
main knowledge gain brought about by such a method? What is the utility of such an approach? As we can 
observe, there are arguments brought to the discussion, arguments that sustain the utility or the input of a method. 
Rorty's conclusion is that an approach which implies historical reconstruction is analogous with the work of an 
anthropologist who studies a primitive community  a community that uses another system of meaning  and 
who tries to determine which are the mechanism used by this community and which are the relations that are 
being established between the members of the community and foreigners. Similarly, in the historiography of 
philosophy such an exercise allows imagining possible interactions between different discourses  philosophical 
ones  and at the same time offer a better understanding of the ideas that belong to a certain philosopher. We are 
interested in having such a perspective becau we want historical knowledge of what unre-educated primitives, 
or dead philosophers and scientists would have said to each other [...] [it] helps us recognize that there have been 
different forms of intelle  [1]. On the other hand, the rational reconstructions  that is to say, 
the anachronistic approaches  in other words the works in which we have conversations with deceased 
philosophers have their utility in the fact that they help us purify the theories belonging to philosophers of the 
past, to filter them so that we can have a better representation of what is truly valuable in their theories and what 
their innovative spirit is formed of. In this sense, Rorty gives as an example the work of P.F. Strawson, The 
Bounds of Sense (1966). But choosing this direction means trying to bring the old philosophers as allies in the 
contemporaries  debates. This means that we will use their ideas to sustain conclusions that even they have not 
reached, because we anachronistically say he [the dead philosopher] would have been driven back on a premise 
which he never formulated, dealing with a topic he never considered  a premise which may have to be suggested 
to him by a friendly rational reconstructo  [1]. So we will have to deal with more than one view of a 
philosopher. For example, Plato will be seen differently by an analytical philosopher who believes that the 
language analysis is the most important feature of philosophy, compared to another philosopher who might 
philosop  rational reconstruction 
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seems to be a more problematic enterprise compared to historical reconstruction, because philosophers can reach 
an agreement regarding the reconsideration of the theories belonging to a thinker only if he gives up his own 
opinion about the essence of philosophy. Even if at a first glance the rational reconstruction seems more 
complicated, I find that historical reconstruction also poses problems regarding the consensus among scholars, 
and this is because of the problem of our beliefs; in this way, a historical reconstruction made by a philosopher of 
language will look different from one made by a continental philosopher, because both of them have different 
opinions about the permanent characteristics of philosophy. In Rorty's words, each author will reeducate Plato in 
different manners.  
Another problem that Rorty signals refers to the relation between the two historiography types. There is a 
difference between the historical reconstruction and the rational reconstruction that is translated in a matter of 
finding out what the dead thinker meant and finding ou  [1]. This gives priority 
to the historical reconstruction: in order to establish what the philosopher meant we have to place his statements 
in the context of the way of thinking representative of those times. We are witnessing a narrowing of the term 
 which restrains its use only to a certain context  the context in which the statements we are referring 
to were already made. Even so, in order to understand a dead philosopher in his own terms, we must have a 
current understanding of the nature of the problems that the philosopher approached; like this we can establish 
thinking about around the time [ ] [1]. 
At the same time  with regard to the problem of truth  
are two interrelated terms; so deciding on what is true depends on the judging policies in which we place a 
certain statement and on the acceptance criteria of that particular system.  
Geistesgeschichte. Geistesgeschichte represents that type of 
historiography where the one writing the history of philosophy is trying to prove a point. This is a type of 
 [1]. This type of historiography has a secondary rank, meaning that 
it is actually an instrument that the philosopher uses in demonstrating the theories he sustains. Here is where the 
idea that the history elief becomes clearer. Compared to the 
history of science, the counts 
 states Rorty [1]. With these considerations in mind, we can make a comparison 
between Geistesgeschichte and rational reconstruction, because both of them are using the history of philosophy 
merely as a tool for self-justification. But from a different point of view, we can also notice several key 
differences. Rational reconstruction is  [ ] and [it is] 
written in the light of some recent work in philosophy which can reasonably be assumed to be about the same 
questions th [1]. While Geistesgeschichte aims to show what Rorty [1] 
also refers to the entire work done by a philosopher, and more specifically, to the 
relations that can be established between s of 
his time, and to the influence his ideas exert upon his followers. And while the rational reconstruction is centered 
upon solutions, Geistesgeschichte is situated at the heart of problematics. I am speaking here about Hegel and 
Foucault, because both of the ,  although I am not quite sure whether 
the term Geistesgeschichte is a good description of what Foucault is doing in his history of ideas, as Rorty 
acknowledges as well. The geistesgeschichtlich histories are ways that allow different thinkers to justify their 
ideas. In another way, this type of historiography is a synthesis of the other two types, because 
geistesgeschichtlich histories are imposing a canon upon how one writes a history, upon who counts as a great 
philosopher and who as a minor one, and upon which are the questions that are truly philosophical. In contrast, 
the history of a specific science  such as biology or chemistry  do   
Arriving at a conclusion, Rorty makes a statement which is also important for my argument. He contends that 
geistesgeschichtlich histories are useful because they can teach us a lesson. Looking back in history, we can 
observe that in other times there were questions that seemed perennial, while in our time we consider them 
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outdated. Thus, geistesgeschichtlich histories cast doubts over whether we can say that our questions and our 
philosophical problems are really important, universal and perennial ones, or whether they are just contingent 
ones.  This conclusion states, once again, the relativist position that Rorty adopts, and at the same time, states a 
superior status of Geistesgeschichte historiography compared to the other two types.  
The fourth type of philosophical histor  This is the most common manner to 
write a history of philosophy, but, in Rorty's [1] opinion, the least valuable. This is because all the work is being 
done using an old canon. An desperate attempts to make Leibniz and Hegel, Mill 
and Nietzsche, Descartes and Carnap, talk about the same common topics, whether the historian and his readers 
have any interest in those topic  [1]. The problem with this type of writing history of philosophy is that it 
is based on the premise that philosophy is a specific mode of knowledge which has access to fundamental 
questions and problems. Each generation of philosophers hopes to finally discover questions which will require 
for the entire history of philosophy to be rebuilt in a manner in which every great philosopher will be treated as if 
he offered answers to these questions. But if we look closer, we can see that the Geistesgeschichte histories and 
historical reconstructions show us that things are not as we think they are. The questions that we have today are 
not the same as those of past philosophers. It is one thing to speculate and to ask ourselves how a certain 
philosopher would answer contemporary philosophical questions, and quite another to state that he actually 
answered these questions. To make a long story short, Rorty's [1] conclusion is that doxography is inefficient and 
does not offer any other added value to historical knowledge, thus, we should give up writing books such as A 
History of Philosophy.  
Rorty's article is a seminal one but even so, his analysis regarding philosophical historiography is not the only 
one made. Among his predecessors we find the Australian philosopher John Passmore with his main articles The 
Idea of a History of Philosophy [2] and Philosiphy, Historiography of [3], the last one being an article published 
in Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Passmore  is not very different from Rorty's paper, and we can say 
that certain aspects covered by the American philosopher are found also in Passmore's statements. But even so, 
there are also important differences between the two. Firstly, Passmore re
with past philosoph  more interested in defending their own position in 
contrast with other philosophers' views. As a result, we have an abstracted vision of history which is produced 
mainly because of the excessive interest in establishing a relation between their own ideas with past ones. 
Pas he had much to say about his predecessors, but his attitude toward them 
was p  [3]. However, I believe that we can find the equiva polemical 
histor  in Rorty's text, this being rational reconstruction. The second category of historiography which Passmore 
.  The doxographic model is imposed by Diogene Laertios who separates philosophers 
,  ignoring the chronological order in most cases. Same as Rorty, Passmore considers this type of 
historiography unsatisfying, criticizing its lack of a substantial critical perspective, only offering a superficial 
vision. The third type of historiography i the history as the passage to truth,  and Passmore mentions Dietrich 
Tiedemann as an exponent with his work, Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie (1791-1797). Tiedemann rejects 
Diogene Laertios  model and tries to apply a linear perspective  a chronological perspective with the main 
discover the leading principle in each philosophy, rather than to simply summarize its principle 
 [3]. Even regular systems on 
philosophers who were certainly innocent o  But the most important 
exponent of this genre is Hegel, who considers that a history of philosophy must expose the relations between 
theories and the manner in which they are connected, and the way in which they succeed from one another. In 
addition to this, the historian has the duty to show how a philosophical system reaches out for the truth. A history 
is not only a collection of facts. If, for Hegel, any conflict between theories will be solved at certain moment in 
the conflict  quite irreconcilable tendencies in 
 [3]. The last two types of historiography that Passmore talks about form the equivalent of 
Rorty's Geistesgeschichte history. In Passmore's [3] terms  and 
41 Mihnea Antila /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  71 ( 2013 )  36 – 44 
problematic history.  Cultural history presents a philosopher by referring to a whole socio-cultural system which 
the philosopher is part of. On the other hand, problematic history represent a history of questions that different 
philosophers started from, and an analysis of the way they reached these questions (why these ones and not other 
ones).  
3. Philosophy as an art of concept creation, a constructivist approach 
After surveying Rorty's text, we can draw one important conclusion  an aspect that is useful for my 
argument. We observed that historiography in general  and the historiography of philosophy in particular  is a 
discipline not characterized by straight-forward things. There are various ways of how to write history, and it is 
obvious from Rorty's [1] and Passmore's [3] analyses that every historiographical instance has some advantages 
and some disadvantages from the point of view of the added value. There is no consensus among scholars 
regarding the best way to approach the history of philosophy. At a first glance, it would seem that confusion rules 
the domain of historiography since historiography is missing a unitary vision. But from my point of view, this 
lack uncovers something else  something implicitly or explicitly emphasized by Rorty: this whole problematic 
constitutes a new domain the philosophy o  When we are 
addressing questions such as hich historiographical method is the best method to describe 
, s historiography a science, and if so, 
we constitute a new area of inquiry where philosophers are entitled to offer answers. But can we say that this area 
of research is really new, or is it just another side of the philosophy of history? In other words, is there a true 
distinction between the philosophy of history and a discipline that we can call the philosophy of historiography  
or is it just another language game? To find the answer to this question we should take each of these terms and 
see what stands behind them.  
, confusion might appear. The confusion is generated by the ambiguity that is 
implied by its differen history  we could refer to a number of different things  
for exam  as a discipline which deals with descriptions about past events, or we 
can strictly talk about past events. One of the authors addressing this problem is Aviezer Tucker in his 
 to A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography [4]. He distinguishes between 
 used only in the sense of pas  of inquiries about history, 
 [4]. This could represent a hint which could be useful for unlocking the mystery of 
the difference between the philosophy of history  and the philosophy of historiography.
the fact that the philosophical vocabulary does not offer a very clear distinction, eve  necessary to 
distinguish the philosophy of historiography from the philosophy of history  [4]. What is commonly used in the 
philosophical jargon is the difference between critical, or analytical philosophy of history, and substantive and 
speculative philosophy of history; yet, Tucker disagrees that these opposing types of philosophies would 
represent an accurate description of what the difference between philosophy of historiography  and philosophy 
of history  genera  A more 
accurate account would be to remain faithful to the distinction that we have just made  the  
as past events  as a description of past events. Indeed, some comparisons between the 
kantian critical project and historiography could be made, as both of them are interested in conditions of 
knowledge, but Tucker contends that the p interested in much more than this 
Kantian proj  [4]. It seems to be the same with the analogy between an analytical philosophy of historiography 
and an analytical philosophy: philosophy of historiography is certainly interested in analyzing the language, but 
there is much more than that. On the other h
 So, while the philosophy of history mainly focuses on examining history, the philosophy of 
historiography is a foray into the ways in which we are talking about past events. It follows, then, that the 
philosophy of historiography is concerned primarily with questions of epistemology. As Tucker explains 
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before philosophers can tell historians what they should do, they should get a good idea of the 
epistemic limits of all  [5]. If the philosophy of historiography is especially interested 
in epistemological questions, then the philosophy of history deals with problems like the following: is history 
contingent or is it necessary; is it linear or cyclical? It follows that philosophy of history parallels sub-fields 
of metaphysics that examine the ultimate constituent part of everything, s  [4]. Of 
course, this is not a clear-cut distinction, because the philosophy of historiography is primarily concerned with 
epistemological problems, but it could also be interested in ontological ones, such as what is the nature of the 
object that we are studying? Or it might even ask questions like what is the nature of  
are they only discovered, or are they constructed , or s the role of interpretation in historiography?  
Moreover, if we are talking about interpretation, then we have to go deeper and talk about theories of truth. And 
if we are talking about interpretation and truth, then we are sent back to the old debates referring to the opposition 
be .  So neither the philosophy of historiography is limited to 
epistemology, nor is the philosophy of history limited to metaphysics.  
Tucker [5] divides the philosophy of historiography in three different categories: phenomenological, 
descriptive, and prescriptive a rigorous examination of the consciousness of 
disciplinary practitioners, su  [5].  It is interested in observing how historians see 
their practice. Tucker is critical of this approach because it can be misleading; many scientists are not fully 
conscious of their own methodologies. He gives Newton as an example, when he presents his ideas in terms of 
dominant inductive philosophy of science, though Newtonian p  [5]. The 
prescriptive philosophy of historiography has as a principal goal to put forth some normative principles. The 
may be a description of the practices of a successful part of a discipline [...] whether 
or n  [5]. Finally the descriptive position is the one which Tucker considers the most 
valuable one. 
We have s  an entire set of specific problems 
which make an autonomous discipline rise. Keeping in mind that one of the specific questions which the 
philosoph what is the nature of the object that we are studying  it follows 
that in the case of the historiography of philosophy we firstly have to determine what is philosophy. In other 
words  which are the specific we give to this 
important question set the path which we are following when we write the history of philosophy. Moreover, the 
answer to this question constitute .   
I would like now to look more deeply to a possible answer that we can give to the question stated above, and I 
will follow the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in setting a definition for philosophy. In 
what would be their last collaborative work, What is Philosophy? [6], Deleuze and Guattari are dealing with the 
question that also interests us. From the very beginning of their book, they clearly state their position regarding 
philosophy is the art of forming, inve  [6]. Looking back in history, 
Deleuze and Guattari speak about what philosophy meant for the Greeks:  
other civilizations had sages, but the Greeks introduce these friends who are not just more modest sages. The Greeks might seem to have 
confirmed the death of the sage and to have replaced him with the philosopher  the friend of wisdom, the one who seeks wisdom but does 
 [6].  
If the sage thinks in Figures, says Deleuze and Guattari [6], then the specificity of the philosopher is that he uses 
and invents Concepts. He is the friend of the concept and of wisdom, in the sense that between the philosopher 
and the concept an intimate bond is established. More simply, we could say that in every good philosopher lays 
latent the potentiality of concept creation  like in Deleuze's and Guattari's [6] example  in the good joiner we 
can find the potential of wood. What else exposes this intimate bond if not the very conditions of thinking itself  
because we cannot think without using concepts, and we cannot think outside them. But Deleuze and Guattari 
philosophy is not the simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are 
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not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products. More rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves 
creating  [6]. Concepts are not like laws of nature, waiting out there to be discovered by someone. They 
have to be created, they have to be put to work always in new modes, they have to be remodeled in a way in 
which to give better accounts, and they have to bear the special mark of their creator. In this sense, Deleuze and 
Plato said that Ideas must be contemplated, but first of all he had to create 
 [6]. This is not to say that although the concepts are created, they could acquire an existence 
in themselves and for themselves. They are always entangled in a web-like net of other concepts. There is no 
every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in history, but in its becoming or 
its present connections. Every concept has components that may,  [6]. So we are 
dealing with an infinite series, and it is clear from this argument that concepts are not created ex nihilo. Another 
feature of concepts is that, although their parts are heterogeneous, there is something that gives them unity there 
is an area ab that belongs to both a and b, where a and b  [6]. Moreover, they interact on 
the same plane with other concepts in order to find new ways of thinking. Another important feature of the 
concept is that it is at the same time absolute and relative. It is relative when we are thinking of 
components, of the plane on which it is defined, and of the problems it is supposed to resolve; but it is absolute 
through the condensation it carries out, the site it occupies on the plane, and the conditions it assigns to the 
 [6]. The important conclusion at which the two phil constructivism unites the 
 [6]. This constitutes my argument  that philosophy is essentially an activity which 
involves the creation of concepts, an activity which offers us  [6], and that 
these concepts are created and modified in the course of the history of philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari [6] 
speak about the Nietzschean verdict that you cannot know anything through concepts, unless you first give them 
birth. Keeping this in mind, we could propose a new type of historiography of philosophy, one which would 
account for a .  In a way, this historiography would be like Rorty's Geistesgeshichte history, 
or intellectual history; the important thing is that such a historiography will be determined by a constructivist 
frame. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper takes as a starting point Richard Rorty  the historiographies of philosophy. Surveying 
his text lead us to the conclusion that historiography of philosophy lacks a certain unitary vision of how to write 
history of philosophy. This suggests that these different views come from the fact that some authors have 
different philosophical opinions about what is the nature of philosophy as a discipline. This then, constitutes a 
new terrain of problematics, one which we can call the philosophy of historiography, distinct from the philosophy 
of history. So, before we begin to write the history of philosophy we should ask ourselves the fundamental 
question: what is philosophy? The answer that we will give to this question will set the path which we will 
follow. Imposing a certain canon on the way of approaching the history of philosophy means that we will have to 
interpret the history according to a matrix of interpretation. I think that the best way to treat the history of 
philosophy is to follow Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari an art of creating 
concepts and, as a consequence, the history of philosophy will be a history which will account for the ways in 
which philosophers succeeded to put concepts to work, to create new concepts which responded to specific 
problems of their epochs. As long as we consider concepts as merely created things and not things that are 
waiting to be discovered, we are obliged to adopt a constructivist approach. 
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